The extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security models, are widely used to provide security arguments for authenticated key exchange protocols that capture leakage of various kinds of secret information like the long-term private key and session-specific secret state. In this paper, we study the open problem on constructing eCK secure AKE protocol without random oracles and NAXOS like trick. A generic construction GC-KKN satisfying those requirements is first given relying on standard cryptographic primitives following the guideline of efficiency. On the second a concrete protocol is proposed which is the first eCK secure protocol in the standard model under both standard assumptions and post-specified peer setting. Both proposed schemes can be more efficiently implemented with secure device than previous eCK secure protocols in the standard model, where the secure device might be normally used to store the long-term private key and implement algorithms of protocol which require to be resilience of state leakage.
Introduction
Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive which forms a crucial component in many network protocols. A two party AKE protocol is executed to enable both parties to end up sharing a session key with assurance that the key is only known to them. The security model for two party AKE and associated definitions have been evolved over years subjecting to increasing security requirements. Recently the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) [8] and extended CanettiKrawczyk (eCK) [26] models, are widely used to provide security arguments for AKE protocols. The CK model introduced a strong query StateReveal, to model the internal states leakage of any running session. In the eCK model, a new query EphemeralKeyReveal is used instead of StateReveal query which is claimed to cover almost all 'session-specific secret' information, and is allowed to be issued even on test session. Moreover there are quite a few variants of (e)CK model used in literatures (e.g., [25, 12, 16] ). The CK+ model is recently used by Fujioka et al. [16] , and the authors adopt StateReveal query in place of EphemeralKeyReveal query to model maximum exposure of states. Similar model has also been introduced before by Cremers [12] which was called eCK' model, where the StateReveal is used either. In this paper, we would like to call both CK+ and eCK' models as eCK model to avoid ambiguity since these models are based on the similar freshness restriction as the original eCK model that is distinct to the first CK model. The eCK model is known to be one of the strongest AKE models that covers the most desirable security attributes for AKE including resistance to key compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks, leakage of secret states and chosen identity and public key (CIDPK) attacks and provision of weak perfect forward secrecy (wPFS). Please note that both CK and eCK models leave out the definition of session state or ephemeral key to specific protocols. Since it is hard to define session state in a general approach, which is independent of any protocols and corresponding implementation scenarios. However the ambiguities on session state may yield a lot of potential problems in either the protocol construction or its security analysis. If any implementer realizes a specific AKE protocol in a careless way allowing it to leak non-trivial session state to attackers, then it would trivially invalidate the security proof in those strong models. On the other hand, to our best of knowledge, no AKE protocol is secure in the (e)CK model if 'all' session states can be revealed. Namely some session states of AKE protocols should be leakage resilience. 1 Implementation Model vs. Session States. In order to fulfil the gap that often exists between formal models and practical security, Sarr et al. [35] introduced two implementation scenarios for the situation that at each party an untrusted host machine is used together with a secure device such as smart card. Similar modelling technique involving secure device was previously used by Bresson et al. [7] . A secure device may usually be used to store long-term cryptographic authentication keys and at least be able to fulfil a library of mathematical functions (such as addition, modulo and exponentiation) which are necessary to implement cryptographic operations or primitives. Hence based on secure device we are able to adopt a 'All-and-Nothing' strategy to define the states that can be revealed without leaving any ambiguity. General speaking we could assume that all intermediate states and ephemeral keys generated on host machine are susceptible to StateReveal attacks to model the maximum state leakage (MSL) attacks, but we treat the secure device as a black-box which is immune to leakage of internal states. 2 Of course one could distribute all protocol computations on the secure device then the security model would equal to a model without StateReveal query. However the security result of a protocol analysed with such implementation scenario must be weaker than that in a case allowing leakage of states. In contrast, our goal is to define the maximum states that can be leaked. As those secure devices might be short in both storage capacity and computational resource, the algorithm on secure device is often causing performance bottleneck of systems. In addition, the communication round between host machine and secure device (which is called HS-round for short) might cause another efficiency problem, since the serial I/O bus of most secure devices is too slow. Due to those facts, it is necessary to optimize AKE protocols when they are realized involving secure device.
NAXOS Trick Revisit. One of the most prominent open questions in the research field on AKE is how to securely implement the NAXOS trick [26] . Such trick is a technique that is introduced to hide the exponent (or de-facto ephemeral key) of an ephemeral public key from an adversary even if the adversary obtains the ephemeral secret key. Please first note that there might exist some variants of NAXOS trick in which the prominent example is the twisted-PRF trick recently used in FSXY scheme [16] . 3 In the sequel, we are going to call all those variants as NAXOS trick. In a typical Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, the ephemeral secret keyx is used as the exponent of the ephemeral public key as X = gx. However, in a protocol designed with NAXOS trick, taking the twisted-PRF trick as example, the exponent of the ephemeral public key is generated as x := PRF(x , a) ⊕ PRF(a,x). Therefore, even though the security model allows an adversary to obtain ephemeral secret keyx, but the exponent of the ephemeral public key is still not exposed to the adversary. However, after applying the twisted-PRF trick, the attacker's interest may still be the exponent of Diffie-Helleman key. Then how to protect such exponent remains an open problem. Exploiting secure device might be one natural solution to protect the output of twisted-PRF trick, since the computation of such trick relies on long-term key which is always stored on secure device and should never be directly passed to host machine. Then the twisted-PRF trick can be realized as follows: (i) the host machine generates the ephemeral keyx and passes it to secure device; (ii) and then the secure device computes the de-facto ephemeral private key x := PRF(x, a) ⊕ PRF(a,x) and keeps the x securely as long-term key, (iii) then compute the ephemeral public key X = g x and send it back to host machine. If the secure device sends the new generated ephemeral private x back to host machine where it will be used then it is also vulnerable to attacks aiming to the originalx chosen at host machine. This implementation approach can be applied to other NAXOS tricks.
Eventually, we could conclude that the NAXOS trick might be necessary if and only if the secure device is unable to generate the randomness. Otherwise the NAXOS trick can be seen identically to choosing the exponent x from a leakage-free random source, e.g. randomness generator of secure device. Besides, all other computations related to NAXOS trick might need to be done on secure device too (e.g. encapsulation algorithm of KEM in the FSXY protocol), since the ephemeral private key generated by NAXOS trick might be stored only on secure device. Those computations would dramatically increase the burden of secure device. On the other hand, the protocol with NAXOS trick is HS-round inefficient since it might need at least two HS-round, in which the first round is used for generate the ephemeral public key and the second round might be used to generate the final session key. In contrast, for a protocol without NAXOS trick, only one HS-round might be enough for session key generation.
Motivating problem. So far there are only few AKE protocols which are provably secure without random oracles in the eCK model. Although the protocols [33, 32, 38] were proven to be eCK secure in the standard model, they require a rather strong class of pseudo-random function family with pairwise independent random sources (which is referred to as πPRF) as key derivation function (KDF). Most recently, Fujioka et al. [16] introduced a generic construction for two-message AKE from key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) which is generalized from BCNP [6] . Although the FSXY scheme [16] is shown to be eCK (CK+) secure in the standard model, it is built relying on a special twisted-PRF trick. The session states defined in FSXY scheme only include the random values used to execute the twisted-PRF trick and IND-CPA KEM. However it is not hard to see if either the ephemeral private key generated by twisted-PRF trick or the encapsulation key of test session is allowed to be leaked via StateReveal query (as the BCNP scheme), then the FSXY protocol is insecure in the eCK model. As discussed above, to securely implement the FSXY protocol, one might need to distribute all computations related to NAXOS trick on secure device. This would lead to inefficiencies in the implementation of the FSXY protocol with secure device. Another drawback of FSXY protocol is that it cannot be executed simultaneously by two session participants. Since, in the protocol description of FSXY, the responder cannot generate the outgoing ciphertext of IND-CPA KEM until it received the ephemeral public key sent by initiator. Hence the FSXY may lose an important feature of one-round AKE protocol.
So far, to our best of knowledge it is still an open question to construct eCK secure protocols without random oracles and without NAXOS trick under standard assumptions (e.g. without πPRF). As those secure devices might be short in both storage capacity and computational resource, the algorithm on secure device is often causing performance bottleneck of systems. Thus it is necessary to seek efficient eCK secure construction which can be efficiently implemented with secure device.
Contributions. We first present an authenticated key exchange protocol (named GC-KKN) to solve the above open problem. In the construction of GC-KKN, we exploit the building blocks including strong randomness extractor (SEXT) family, and pseudo-random function (PRF) family, passively secure one-round key exchange (KE) protocols, IND-CCA secure key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) schemes, and CKS-light secure non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) schemes [15] (that is secure against chosen identity and long-term public key attacks). Each building block is required to cope with specific attacks following the guideline that the used assumption is as weak as possible. For example, to provide weak perfect forwards secrecy, the passively secure one-round key exchange is enough, whereas to deal with maximum states leakage we may need CKS-light secure non-interactive key exchange. The NIKE can be instantiated with the schemes based on factorization problem or Diffie-Hellman problem as proposed by Freire et al. [15] . Similar to FSXY protocol, the KEM in our construction could be instantiated using any IND-CCA secure scheme based on hardness of factorization problem, code-based problem, lattice-based problem and so forth. As opposed to FSXY scheme, GC-KKN does not rely on any NAXOS alike trick, that yields a more efficient solution when it is implemented with secure device. We give compact game-based proofs reducing eCK security of GC-KKN to break the used cryptographic primitives without random oracles.
On the second we present a practical AKE protocol (P1) that is eCK secure under standard assumptions (e.g. without πPRF). The proposed protocol is based on bilinear pairings, target collision resistant hash function family, and pseudo-random function family. To be of independent interesting, P1 is able to run under post-specified peer setting [9] (i.e. without knowing any information of communication peer at session activation), unlike FSXY scheme and our GC-KKN scheme which might be executed under only pre-specified peer setting (i.e. they need the public key of peer to run the KEM). Our construction idea of P1 is inspired by the GC-KKN. We observe that it is possible to merge those computations in KE, KEM and NIKE schemes if they work under the same algebraic groups. In order to be secure against active attackers, each party (including the attacker) is required to construct some kind of 'tag' to encode consistency information on its chosen (either long-term or ephemeral) public keys based on specific weak Programmable Hash Function [18] . Those tags are particularly customized to be independent of any information about receivers, which enables P1 to be able to run in the post-specified peer setting. Although the consistency check of those tags might be relatively expensive, fortunately all pairing (including partial session key material generation) can be done on more powerful host machine rather than on computational resource-limited secure device (which is only used to generate final session key). In order to securely implement P1, only one exponentiation is required on secure device that is the more efficient than any previous eCK secure protocols without random oracles.
Related Works. In 1986, Matsumoto et al. [28] first studied the Diffie-Hellman based key exchange protocols with implicit key authentication that result in a line of research on one-round AKE. Meanwhile, the most famous and efficient one is the MQV protocol by Menezes, Qu, and Vanstone [30, 27] . On Crypto 2005 conference, Krawczyk [25] presented a hashed variant of MQV called HMQV, which is formally proven secure in a modified CK [8] model referred as CH HMQV , relying on random oracles and strong assumptions (i.e. gap Diffie-Hellman assumption [34] and knowledge of exponent assumption [2] ). Krawczyk also showed that HMQV protocol offers more security features than MQV, in particular for resistance to KCI attacks, UKS attacks and the leakage of secret states. However Menezes [29] pointed out that the chosen identity and long-term public key attacks on HMQV are not formally studied in [25] . Besides, the application of secure module was also suggested by HMQV protocol [25] to prevent the leakage of intermediate secrets. But the detailed implementation approach was not elaborated.
In 2007 LaMacchia et al. [26] proposed an extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model, in which the adversary is equipped with a EphemeralKeyReveal query to access all ephemeral private input required to carry on session key computations which is similar to the StateReveal query in the CK model. e.g. [35, 37, 33, 32, 38] , are proposed to capture eCK security. However, most of those schemes are only provably secure in the random oracle model. Since then many AKE protocols many protocols, e.g. [33, 32, 38] , are proposed to provide eCK security without random oracles. But they require the πPRF family as key derivation function that is hard to realize in practical.
As for generic two party AKE constructions, e.g. the BCNP [6] and FSXY [16] schemes based on IND-CCA secure KEM, the session states that can be revealed are never clearly defined which makes theirs security analysis incomplete. In particular, we notice that the twisted-PRF technique used in the FSXY protocol (also used in [33] ) may need to be implemented with secure device to achieve leakage resilience on new generated ephemeral private key by such trick. As the above discussion regarding NAXOS trick, that might increase unnecessary workload on secure device. Basically the FSXY protocol is built in an inefficient manner. Please note that there are a lot of works such as [32, 37, 23] which are motivated to construct key exchange protocols without the NAXOS tricks. As well this is also one of the motivations of our work.
With respect to the protection of session states involving secure device, two implementation scenarios and corresponding security models have been studied in literatures [35, 39] . Basically, the implementation of the AKE protocol is divided into two parts which are respectively run at host machine (which is subject to attacks on session states) and at secure device. In corresponding security model, the adversary is able to reveal all possible states stored at host machine, but the secure device is treated as a black-box which is resilience of the leakage of intermediate values.
Preliminaries
Notations. We let κ ∈ N denote the security parameter and 1 κ the string that consists of κ ones. Let a "hat" on top of a capital letter denote an identity; without the hat the letter denotes the public key of that party. Let [n] = {1, . . . , n} ⊂ N be the set of integers between 1 and n. If S is a set, then a $ ← S denotes the action of sampling a uniformly random element from S. Let IDS be an identity space. Let K AKE be the key space of session key, and {PK, SK} be key spaces for long-term public/private key respectively. Those spaces are associated with security parameter κ. The min-entropy is a formal indicator for 'good' key distribution of a key (say the key of following KE scheme, KEM scheme and NIKE scheme).
Min-entropy and Strong Randomness Extractors
Let SEXT : S SEXT × M SEXT → R SEXT be a function family associated with seed space S SEXT , domain M SEXT , and range R SEXT .
Definition 2. We say that function SEXT is a (κ, SEXT )-strong randomness extractor, if for any variable m distributed over M SEXT that has min-entropy κ and for any seed k SEXT which is chosen uniformly at random from S SEXT and for any value R which is chosen uniformly at random from R SEXT , the two distributions k SEXT , SEXT(k SEXT , m) and k SEXT , R have statistical distance at most SEXT . i.e. 1 2
In the context where the seed k SEXT is clear we will write SEXT(X) for SEXT(k SEXT , X). As suggested by Dodis et al. [14] , one could use a pseudo-random function as a strong randomness extractor. Some good results on key derivation and randomness extraction can be also found in [10] .
Target Collision-Resistant Hash Functions
Let TCRHF : K TCRHF × M TCRHF → Y TCRHF be a family of keyed-hash functions associated with key space K TCRHF , message space M TCRHF and hash value space Y TCRHF . The public key hk TCRHF ∈ K TCRHF of a hash function TCRHF(hk TCRHF , ·) is generated by a PPT algorithm TCRHF.KG(1 κ ) on input security parameter κ.
where the probability is over the random bits of A.
Note that the notion of target collision resistance is weaker than the notion of collision resistance. As suggested in [11] , normally target collision resistant functions can be realized with a specific cryptographic hash function such as MD5 and SHA. If the hash key hk TCRHF is obvious from the context, we write TCRHF(m) for TCRHF(hk TCRHF , m).
Passively Secure One-round Key Exchange Protocols
A key-exchange protocol (KE) is a protocol executed between two parties, that enables those two parties to compute a shared secret key. In the following, we formally provide a technical definition of passively secure (PS) key exchange protocols within two pass.
A one-round key exchange protocol KE = (KE.Setup, KE.EKGen, KE.SKGen) consists of three algorithms:
• pms ke ← KE.Setup(1 κ ): this algorithm takes as input a security parameter κ and outputs a set of system parameters pms ke , e.g. a large prime and a group generator. The parameters pms ke might be implicitly used by other algorithms for simplicity.
• (esk, epk)
The ephemeral key generator takes as input, the parameter pms ke , and outputs an ephemeral key pair (esk, epk) that consist of the ephemeral secret key esk and the ephemeral public key epk.
• k ← KE.SKGen(esk ID 1 , epk ID 2 ): The session key generator KE.SKGen is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that given as input esk ID 1 and epk ID 2 outputs the session key k.
The ephemeral public keys are exchanged by the parties, e.g. party ID 1 sends epk ID 1 to party ID 2 who sends epk ID 2 to ID 1 . We only consider the key exchange protocols with perfect correctness that is
The KE protocol in our construction should satisfy the following two conditions: (i) the protocol is executed without any long-term key(s); (ii) all ephemeral public/secret key vector (epk, esk) are chosen freshly and randomly from corresponding key spaces for each protocol instance. Similar restrictions are made on the KE protocols which are used in the recent AKE compiler by Jager, Kohlar, Schaege, and Schwenk (JKSS) [20] .
We haven chosen to restrict our attention to this class of key exchange protocols because they either allow for efficient protocols with very high security guarantees (like forward secrecy) or can efficiently be recognized. We stress that important key exchange mechanisms like ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange falling into this class. In order to model passive attacks we define an Execute(ID 1 , ID 2 ) query. The adversary can use the this query to perform passive attacks in which the attacker initiates and eavesdrops on honest executions between party ID 1 and party ID 2 . Note that each identity should be uniquely chosen from space IDS. By using this query the adversary can obtain the transcripts that were exchanged during the honest execution of the protocol, and corresponding established session key.
Security Experiment EXP
ps KE,A (κ): On input security parameter κ, the security experiment is proceeded as a game between a challenger C and an adversary A based on a key exchange protocol KE, where the following steps are performed:
1. A challenger pms ke ← KE.Setup(1 κ ) and generates a set of identities {ID 1 , . . . , ID } for potential protocol participants where i ∈ [ ] and ∈ N. The adversary is given pms ke and all identities as input and is allowed to interact with challenger via making Execute(ID i , ID j ) query at most d times for each party where d ∈ N. As response, the challenger returns (T, K 0 ) to adversary.
2. At some point, the adversary outputs a special symbol for challenge. Given , the challenger runs a new protocol instance, obtaining the transcript T and key K 0 , samples K 1 uniformly at random from the key space of the protocol, and tosses a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}. Then it returns (T, K b ) to the adversary. After that the adversary may continue making Execute(ID i , ID j ) queries. Finally, adversary A may terminate with outputting a bit b .
At the end of the experiment, 1 is returned if all following conditions hold:
• A has issued a Test query to an oracle π s i without failure, • π s i is fresh throughout the security game, and • A returned a bit b which equals to b of Test-query;
Otherwise 0 is returned.
Definition 4.
We say that a key-exchange protocol KE satisfying the above two conditions is (t, KE )-passively-secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time t adversary holds that | Pr[EXP ke Σ,A (κ) = 1]−1/2| ≤ KE for some negligible function KE = KE (κ) in the security parameter κ.
Key Encapsulation Mechanism Schemes
A KEM scheme consists of four polynomial time algorithms KEM = (KEM.Setup, KEM.Gen, KEM.EnCap, KEM.DeCap) with the following semantics:
• pms kem ← KEM.Setup(1 κ ): this algorithm takes as input a security parameter κ and outputs a set of system parameters pms kem . The parameters pms kem might be implicitly used by other algorithms for simplicity.
• (pk, sk) $ ← KEM.Gen(pms kem ): a key generation algorithm which on input parameter pms kem , outputs a pair of long-term encryption/decryption keys (pk, sk) ∈ (PK, SK).
• (K, C) $ ← KEM.EnCap(pk): an encryption algorithm which takes as input parameter pms kem , an encapsulation key pk, outputs a session key K ∈ K KEM and ciphertext C ∈ C KEM , where K KEM is a session key space, and C KEM is a ciphertext space.
• (K) ← KEM.DeCap(sk, C): a decryption algorithm which takes as input parameter pms kem , a decapsulation key sk and a ciphertext C ∈ C KEM , and outputs a session key K ∈ K KEM .
All 'spaces' for the corresponding values are parametrized with security parameter κ. Here, we recall the definition of IND-CCA security for KEM as follows.
Definition 5. We say that a key encapsulation mechanism scheme KEM is (q, t, KEM )-secure (key indistinguishable) against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, if it holds that | Pr[EXP
for all adversaries A running in probabilistic polynomial time t in the following experiment:
where KEM = KEM (κ) is a negligible function in the security parameter κ and the number of DEC(sk, ·) queries is bound by time t.
Pseudo-Random Functions
The concept of pseudo-random functions is introduced by Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali in [17] . Let PRF : K PRF × D PRF → R PRF denote a family of deterministic functions, where K PRF is the key space, D PRF is the domain and R PRF is the range of PRF for security parameter κ. Let RL = {(x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x q , y q )} be a list which is used to record bit strings formed as tuple (x i , y i ) ∈ (D PRF , R PRF ) where 1 ≤ i ≤ q and q ∈ N. In RL each x is associated with a y. Let RF : D PRF → R PRF be a stateful uniform random function, which can be executed at most a polynomial number of q times and keeps a list RL for recording each invocation. On input a message x ∈ D PRF , the function RF(x) is executed as follows:
• If x ∈ RL, then return corresponding y ∈ RL,
• Otherwise return y $ ← R PRF and record (x, y) into RL.
Definition 6. We say that PRF is a (q, t, PRF )-secure pseudo-random function family, if it holds that | Pr[EXP ind−cma PRF,A (κ) = 1] − 1/2| ≤ PRF for all adversaries A that make a polynomial number of oracle queries q while running in time at most t in the following experiment:
Otherwise return RF(x); Otherwise return 0;
where PRF = PRF (κ) is a negligible function in the security parameter κ, and the number of allowed queries q is bound by t.
Secure Non-Interactive Key Exchange Protocols
Notions for Non-Interactive Key Exchange. We consider a Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE) scheme in the public key setting consists of three algorithms: NIKE.Setup, KGen and NIKE.ShareKey associated with an identity space IDS and a shared key space K NIKE , in which those algorithms have following semantics:
• pms nike ← NIKE.Setup(1 κ ): this algorithm takes as input a security parameter κ and outputs a set of system parameters pms nike . The parameters pms nike might be implicitly used by other algorithms for simplicity.
• (sk ID , pk ID ) $ ← KGen(pms nike , ID): this algorithm takes as input pms nike and a identity ID, and outputs a pair of long-term private/public key (sk ID , pk ID ) for the party ID.
• K $ ← NIKE.ShareKey(ID 1 , sk ID 1 , ID 2 , pk ID 2 ): this algorithm takes as input parameter pms nike , an identity ID 1 and a secret key sk ID 1 along with another identity ID 2 and corresponding public key pk ID 2 , and outputs either a shared key K ∈ K NIKE for the two parties, or a failure symbol ⊥. This algorithm is assumed to always output ⊥ if input identities are not distinct.
For correctness, we require that, for a tuple of identities (ID 1 , ID 2 ), and corresponding key pairs (sk ID 1 , pk ID 1 ) and (sk ID 2 , pk 3 ), algorithm NIKE.ShareKey satisfies the constraint:
Security Definition for NIKE. In this section we recall the CKS-light formal security model for a two party PKI-based non-interactive authenticated key-exchange (NIKE) protocol proposed in [15] . But we do slightly modification on modelling public key registration. Specifically, each party ID i might be required to provide extra information (denoted by pf ID i ) to prove the registered public key is sound. In practice, the concrete implementation of pf is up to the CA [1] and may be either interactive or non-interactive. Examples can be found in RFC 4210 [1] and PKCS#10. Let {Honest, Dishonest} be two vector lists.
Security Experiment EXP cks−light
NIKE,A (κ): On input security parameter κ, the security experiment is proceeded as a game between a challenger C and an adversary A based on a non-interactive key exchange protocol NIKE, where the following steps are performed:
1. The C first run pms nike ← NIKE.Setup(1 κ ) and gives pms nike to adversary A.
2. The adversary A may interact with challenger C with the following queries:
• RegisterHonest(ID): on input an identity ID ∈ IDS, if ID / ∈ {Honest, Dishonest} then C runs NIKE.KGen(pms nike , ID) to generate a long-term secret/public key pair (sk ID , pk ID ) ∈ (PK, SK) and adds the tuple (ID, sk ID , pk ID ) into the list Honest, and returns pk to A; as otherwise a failure symbol ⊥ is returned. This queries is allowed to query at most twice. Parties established by this query are called honest.
• RegisterCorrupt(ID τ , pk IDτ , pf IDτ ): This query allows the adversary to register an identity ID τ and a long-term public key pk IDτ on behalf of a party ID τ , if the ID τ / ∈ {Honest, Dishonest} and pk IDτ is ensured to be sound by evaluating the non-interactive proof pf IDτ . We only require that the proof is non-interactive in order to keep the model simple. Parties established by this query are called dishonest.
• RevealKey nike (ID 1 , ID 2 ): On input a tuple of registered identities (ID 1 , ID 2 ), C returns a failure symbol ⊥ if both parties ID 1 and ID 2 are dishonest. Otherwise C run NIKE.ShareKey using the secret key of one of the honest parties in (ID 1 , ID 2 ) and the public key of the other party and returns the result to A
Otherwise the challenger C samples a random bit b $ ← {0, 1}, and it answers this query in terms of the bit b. Specifically, if b = 1, C runs NIKE.ShareKey using the secret key of ID 1 and the public key of ID 2 to obtain the shared key K 1 ; else if b = 0, the challenger generates a random key K 1 . C returns K b to adversary. This query can be queried only once.
3. Eventually, the adversary may terminate with outputting a bit b .
At the end of the experiment, 1 is returned if all following conditions hold:
• A has issued a Test nike query without failure on input identities (ID 1 , ID 2 ),
• Both parties ID 1 and ID 2 are honest,
• A has not issued RevealKey query on input identities (ID 1 , ID 2 ) in either order, and
Otherwise 0 is returned. (κ) = 1] − 1/2| ≤ NIKE for all adversaries A running within time t in the above security experiment and for some negligible probability NIKE = NIKE (κ) in the security parameter κ.
Note that if the query RegisterCorrupt(ID τ , pk IDτ , pf IDτ ) is made with pf = ∅ then the above model equals the CKS-light model [15] ; Otherwise it is slightly weaker than CKS-light model. The number of RegisterCorrupt queries is bound by the time t. In this model, we adopt a slightly variant CKS-light model for simplicity which is strong enough for our AKE construction.
Bilinear Groups
In the following, we briefly recall some of the basic properties of bilinear groups. Our AKE solution mainly consists of elements from a single group G. We therefore concentrate on symmetric bilinear maps. The bilinear groups will be parameterized by a symmetric pairing parameter generator, denoted by PG.Gen. This is a polynomial time algorithm that on input a security parameter 1 κ , returns the description of two multiplicative cyclic groups G and G T of the same prime order p, generator g for G, and a bilinear computable pairing e : G × G → G T .
Definition 8 (Symmetric Bilinear groups). We call
PG = (G, g, G T , p, e) $ ← PG.Gen(1 κ )be a set of symmetric bilinear groups, if the function e is an (admissible) bilinear map and it holds that: 1. Bilinear: for all a, b ∈ G and x, y ∈ Z p , we have e(a x , b y ) = e(a, b) xy . 2. Non-degenerate: e(g, g) = 1 G T , is a generator of group G T . 3. Efficiency: e is efficiently computable for all (a, b) ∈ G.
Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let PG = (G, g, G T , p, e) denote the description of symmetric bilinear groups as Definition 8. We first consider the following traditional version of Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) problem for symmetric pairing. The Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) problem is stated as follows: given tuple (g a , g b , g c , e(g, g) γ ) for (a, b, c, γ) ∈ (Z * p ) 4 as input, output 1 if e(g, g) γ = e(g, g) abc and 0 otherwise.
Definition 9.
We say that the BDDH problem relative to generator PG.Gen is (t, BDDH )-hard, if the probability bound | Pr[EXP bddh PG.Gen,A (κ) = 1] − 1/2| ≤ BDDH holds for all adversaries A running in probabilistic polynomial time t in the following experiment:
where BDDH = BDDH (κ) is a negligible function in the security parameter κ.
Security Model
In this section we present the formal security model for two party PKI-based authenticated keyexchange (AKE) protocol. In this model, while emulating the real-world capabilities of an active adversary, we provide an 'execution environment' for adversaries following an important research line research [5, 8, 25, 26, 21, 38] which is initiated by Bellare and Rogaway [3] . In the sequel, we will use the similar framework as [21] .
Execution Environment. In the execution environment, we fix a set of honest parties {ID 1 , . . . , ID } for ∈ N, where ID i (i ∈ [ ]) is the identity of a party which is chosen uniquely from space IDS. Each identity is associated with a long-term key pair (sk ID i , pk ID i ) ∈ (SK, PK) for authentication. Note that those identities are also lexicographically indexed via variable i ∈ [ ]. Each honest party ID i can sequentially and concurrently execute the protocol multiple times with different indented partners, this is characterized by a collection of oracles {π s i : 4 Oracle π s i behaves as party ID i carrying out a process to execute the s-th protocol 4 An oracle in this paper might be alternatively written as π 
Adversarial
Model. An adversary A in our model is a PPT Turing Machine taking as input the security parameter 1 κ and the public information (e.g. generic description of above environment), which may interact with these oracles by issuing the following queries.
• Send(π s i , m): The adversary can use this query to send any message m of his own choice to oracle π s i . The oracle will respond the next message m * (if any) to be sent according to the protocol specification and its internal states. Oracle π s i would be initiated as initiator via sending the oracle the first message m = ( , ID j ) consisting of a special initialization symbol and a value ID j . The ID j is either the identity ID j of intended partner or empty string ∅. After answering a Send query, the variables (Ψ s i , Φ s i , K s i , st s i , sT s i , rT s i ) will be updated depending on the specific protocol. 5 • RevealKey(π s i ): Oracle π s i responds with the contents of variable K s i .
• StateReveal(π s i ): Oracle π s i responds with the secret state stored in variable st s i .
• Corrupt(ID i ): Oracle π 1 i responds with the long-term secret key sk ID i of party
• RegisterCorrupt(ID τ , pk IDτ , pf IDτ ): This query allows the adversary to register an identity ID τ ( < τ < N) and a static public key pk IDτ on behalf of a party ID τ , if ID τ is unique and pk IDτ is ensured to be sound by evaluating the non-interactive proof pf IDτ . We only require that the proof is non-interactive in order to keep the model simple. Parties established by this query are called dishonest.
• Test(π s i ): If the oracle has state Ω = reject or K s i = ∅, then the oracle π s i returns some failure symbol ⊥. Otherwise it flips a fair coin b, samples a random element K 0 from key space K AKE , and sets K 1 = K s i . Finally the key K b is returned. This query is allowed to be asked at most once during the following security game. 5 For example, the variable Ψ s i might be set as identity IDj at some point when the oracle receives a message containing the identity of its partner; the messages m and m * will be appended to transcript rT s i and sT s i respectively. A protocol here might be either run in pre-or post-specified peer setting [9, 31] . As for a protocol running under post-specified peer setting, we always have that IDj = ∅.
We stress that the exact meaning of the StateReveal must be defined by each protocol separately, and each protocol should be proven secure to resist with such kind of state leakage as its claimed, i.e., the content stored in the variable st during protocol execution. In other word, each protocol should define the protocol steps processed on secure device. Of course one could distribute all protocol computations on the secure device then the security model would equal to a model without StateReveal query. However the security result of a protocol analysed under such implementation scenario must be weaker than that in a case allowing leakage of states. In contrast, our goal is to define the maximum states that can be leaked. The EstablishParty query is used to model the chosen identity and public key attacks. In this query, the detail form of pf should be specified by each protocol. Please note that one could specify pf = ∅ to model arbitrary public key registration without checking anything.
Secure AKE Protocols. To formalize the notion that two oracles are engaged in an on-line communication, we define the partnership via matching sessions which was first formulated by Krawczyk [25] .
Definition 10 (Matching sessions). We say that an oracle π s i has a matching session to oracle π t j , if π s i has sent all protocol messages and all the following conditions hold:
• Ψ s i = ID j and Ψ t j = ID i ,
• sT s i = rT t j and rT s i = sT t j .
Correctness. We say an AKE protocol Σ is correct, if two oracles π s i and π t j accept with matching sessions, then both oracles hold the same session key, i.e. K s i = K t j . For the security definition, we need the notion of freshness of an oracle.
Definition 11 (Freshness). Let π s
i be an accepted oracle with intended partner ID j . Let π t j be an oracle (if it exists), such that π s i has a matching session to π t j . Then the oracle π s i is said to be fresh if none of the following conditions holds:
2.
A queried either RevealKey(π s i ) or RevealKey(π t j ) (if π t j exists).
3.
A queried both Corrupt(ID i ) and StateReveal(π s i ).
4. If π t j exists, A queried both Corrupt(ID j ) and StateReveal(π t j ).
If π t j does not exist, A queried Corrupt(ID j ).
Security Experiment EXP AKE Σ,A (κ): On input security parameter 1 κ , the security experiment is proceeded as a game between a challenger C and an adversary A based on an AKE protocol Σ, where the following steps are performed:
1. At the beginning of the game, the challenger C implements the collection of oracles {π s i : i ∈ [ ], s ∈ [d]}, and generates long-term key pairs (pk ID i , sk ID i ) and corresponding proof pf ID i (if any) for all honest parties ID i for i ∈ [ ] where the identity ID i ∈ IDS of each party is chosen uniquely. C gives adversary A all identities, public keys and corresponding proofs { (ID 1 , pk ID 1 , pf ID 1 ) , . . . , (ID , pk , pf )} as input. 4. At the end of the game, the A may terminate with returning a bit b as its guess for b of Test query.
A may issue polynomial number of queries as aforementioned, namely

Finally, 1 is returned if all following conditions hold:
• A has issued a Test query on an oracle π s i without failure, • π s i is fresh throughout the security game, and • A returned a bit b which equals to b of Test-query;
Definition 12 (Session Key Security). A correct AKE protocol Σ is called (t, )-session-key-secure if probability bound | Pr[EXP AKE
Σ,A (κ) = 1] − 1/2| ≤ holds for all adversaries A running within time t in the above security experiment and for some negligible probability = (κ) in the security parameter κ.
A Generic One-round AKE Construction from KE, KEM and NIKE
In this section, we present a generic one-round authenticated key exchange protocol from KE, KEM and NIKE (denoted by GC-KKN), that is more suitable to be implemented for providing eCK security than previous works. In our generic construction, the following building blocks are required in the sense of definitions in Section 2:
• Passively secure one-round key exchange scheme KE = (KE.Setup, KE.EKGen, KE.SKGen).
• IND-CCA secure key encapsulation mechanism scheme KEM = (KEM.Setup, KEM.Gen, KEM.EnCap, KEM.DeCap).
• CKS-light secure non-interactive key exchange scheme NIKE = (NIKE.Setup, NIKE.KGen, NIKE.ShareKey).
• Strong randomness extractor SEXT(·, ·) : S SEXT × M SEXT → R SEXT . We assume that the space M SEXT matches the key spaces of KE, KEM and NIKE schemes.
• Pseudo-random function family PRF(·, ·) :
Design Principle. The first attack we need to cope with is the chosen ephemeral key attacks against an uncorrupted party which might be only one that is not corrupted in the AKE security experiment, i.e. the adversary breaks the eCK security of considered protocol under freshness case C6 (shown in Appendix 4.2). The CEK attack informally addresses the situation that the adversary tries to obtain non-trivial information about test oracle (whose states are not leaked) by injecting ephemeral keys of her own choice to manipulate the session keys of other oracles (from which he can reveal key via RevealKey query). In order to handle CEK attacks, we utilize the IND-CCA secure KEM scheme as both FSXY [16] and BCNP [6] schemes. Since the IND-CCA secure KEM is known as one of the most efficient and effective solutions which can withstand this kind of attack.
The IND-CCA security is necessary to simulate RevealKey queries to oracles of target uncorrupted party (say the intended communication partner of test oracle) without knowing corresponding longterm private key in the proof simulation. Meanwhile, we might ask DEC oracle provided by KEM experiment for help. On the second, we have to consider security of test oracle when its session states are leaked. The worst case (which might be very likely to happen) is that test oracle received an ephemeral key which is chosen by adversary, or the session states are disclosed from both test oracle and its partner session. In either case, the adversary may know all ephemeral secrets used to compute the session key of test oracle without knowing the long-term keys of session participants of test oracle. This is also why the FSXY construction needs expensive NAXOS like trick to generate certain intermediate secret that is leakage resilience. To deal with this situation without NAXOS trick, our solution is to use non-interactive key exchange scheme, namely we make use of the long-term shared key of session participants to compute part of session key. This makes sense due to the fact that the long-term keys of session participants are not corrupted. We need the CKS-light security for NIKE scheme since we have to 'appropriately' simulate the session keys of uncorrupted oracles in presence of adversary who can register identities and public keys of her own choice (i.e. via RegisterCorrupt query).
While considering the wPFS attack in which long-term keys of both participants might be leaked. Intuitively, we cannot make use of KEM or NIKE schemes to achieve wPFS security property, since the security of both schemes relies on uncompromised long-term keys. Unlike the FSXY [16] scheme, we do not adopt to IND-CPA secure KEM (which is called as wKEM in FSXY) in the construction since wKEM cannot be executed simultaneously by two sessions. Namely the responder cannot generate the outgoing ciphertext until it received the ephemeral public key sent by initiator. Our solution avoids this circumstance via exploiting passively secure one-round key exchange protocol KE without long-term keys. This is a generalization from the BCNP construction [6] wherein only Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [13] is considered. Our construction is able to be instantiated with any other passively secure one-round key exchange protocols.
Protocol Description
Set-up: To initiate the system, the public system parameters pms := (pms ke , pms kem , pms nike , k SEXT ) are firstly generated via performing pms ke ← KE.Setup(1 κ ), pms kem ← KEM.Setup(1 κ ), pms nike ← NIKE.Setup(1 κ ) and k SEXT $ ← S SEXT . . As for certain NIKE scheme, the interactive zero-knowledge proof scheme might be required to ensure the registered public key is consistent (e.g. the factoring based NIKE in [15] ).
Long-term key Generation and
Protocol Execution: On input parameters pms := (pms ke , pms kem , pms nike , k SEXT ), the protocol between partyÂ and partyB is proceeded as following which is also informally depicted in Figure 1: 1. Upon activation a session atÂ, it performs the steps: eK := SEXT(eK) 
Session States and Implementaton Senario. We now define the session states in terms of implementation model with secure device. Basically, all states of KE.EKGen, KE.SKGen and KEM.EnCap algorithms would be stored in the state variable st. For instance the state of an oracle π sÂ might include values (eskÂ, eKÂ, eK Â , eK Â , KÂ, K Â , K Â ) appeared in the above protocol description and other randomness or intermediate values generated within algorithms: KE.EKGen , KE.SKGen and KEM.EnCap. Namely those algorithms can be executed on host machine. However, we assume no secret states related to KEM.DeCap and NIKE.ShareKey algorithms can be revealed. This can be realized by doing all computations involving long-term private key of KEM.DeCap and NIKE.ShareKey algorithms, and final session key generation on secure device, i.e. processing the steps 3.(d,e,f) and 4.(d,e,f) on secure device. In particular KEM.DeCap and NIKE.ShareKey algorithms might involve expensive consistency check operations, say pairing operations in pairing-based NIKE [15] . But we stress that the computations of KEM.DeCap and NIKE.ShareKey algorithms without using longterm private key and without using values generated by long-term private key, can be done on host machine for efficiency consideration.
Security Analysis
We assume without loss of generality that the maximum probability for the event that two oracles output the same ciphertext C or ephemeral public key epk, is a negligible fraction 1/2 λ where λ ∈ N is a large enough integer in terms of the security parameter κ. Let MAX(X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ) denote the function to obtain the maximum values from variables X 1 , X 2 and X 3 . Theorem 1. Suppose that the SEXT is (κ, SEXT )-strong randomness extractor, the KEM is (q kem , t, KEM )-IND-CCA secure and KE is (t, KE )-passively secure, and the pseudo-random function PRF is (q prf , t, PRF )-secure, and the NIKE is (t, NIKE )-secure non-interactive scheme with respect to the definitions in Section 2. And we assume that either KE key or KEM key or NIKE key has κ-min-entropy. Then the proposed protocol is (t , )-session-key-secure in the sense of Definition 12 with t ≤ t, q kem ≥ d and q prf ≥ d, and
The proof of this theorem is presented in the Appendix A.
An Efficient One-round AKE Protocol under Standard Assumptions
In this section we present an eCK secure AKE protocol P1 in the standard model based on Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. The proposed protocol relies on bilinear pairings, target collision resistant hash function family, and pseudo-random function family. This protocol can be implemented more efficiently involving secure device, that only one regular exponentiation is required on secure device and other expensive operations can be done on host machine.
Design Principle. The construction of P1 can be seen as a concrete instantiation of GC-KKN scheme. We first observe that it is possible to merge those computations in KE, KEM and NIKE schemes if they work under the same algebraic groups. However the standard CKS-light secure NIKE scheme is rare so far. Our AKE construction is based on the pairing-based NIKE scheme [15] with slight modifications rather than the factoring-based NIKE scheme [15] because the latter requires an interactive key registration protocol to ensure the consistency of public key. Unlike the pairing-based NIKE scheme [15] , we retort to target collision resistant hash function family instead of collision resistant chameleon hash function family to relax the assumption. This is possible because we could alternatively bind the identities of session participants with each session key using pseudo-random functions. In order to battle against CEK attacks, each party (including the attacker) is required to construct some kind of 'tag' based on specific weak Programmable Hash Function [18] to encode consistency information on its chosen (either long-term or ephemeral) public keys. Those tags are particularly customized to be independent of any information about receivers, which enable our protocol to be able to run in the post-specified peer setting. However we have to make use of the pairing to provide a means of consistency checking that (both long-term and ephemeral) public keys coming from the adversary are in some sense of well-formed. Fortunately, those expensive consistency checks can be done on host machine.
Protocol Description
The proposed protocol takes as input the following building blocks which are initialized respectively in terms of the security parameter κ:
• Symmetric bilinear groups PG = (G, g, G T , p, e) $ ← PG.Gen(1 κ ) and along with random values
• a pseudo-random function family PRF(·, ·) :
The variable pms stores the public system parameters pms := (PG, {u i } 1≤i≤4 , hk TCRHF ).
Long-term Key Generation and Registration: On input pms := (PG, {u i } 2≤i≤4 , hk TCRHF ), a partyÂ may run an efficient algorithm (skÂ, pkÂ, ∅) $ ← KGen(pms,Â) to generate the longterm key pair as:
3 u 2 ) a and h A = TCRHF(A). Please note that we allow arbitrary key registration, i.e. the adversary is able to query RegisterCorrupt(Â, pkÂ, ∅) with pfÂ = ∅.
Protocol Execution : On input pms := (PG, {u i } 1≤i≤4 , hk TCRHF ), the protocol between partieŝ A andB proceeds as following which is also depicted in the Figure 2. 1. Upon activation a new session, the partyÂ performs the steps: , session key as k e := PRF(k, sid).
Implementation and Session States:
We assume that only the ephemeral private key x (resp. y) would be stored in the state variable st, and these states are the maximum states which can be compromised by adversary. This can be guaranteed by performing the computations of key material k and session key k e (i. and finally session key on secure device, where βÂ := e(u 1 , BY ) is computed on host machine. We stress that all other expensive operations (such as pairing) can be done on host machine which is normally more powerful than secure device. Of course one could execute the whole protocol on secure device, but then it will be much less efficient. Instead we only assume that the most necessary computations are done on secure device without pairing operations. We treat those secure device as a black-box which might take as input the ephemeral key and prepared key materials (e.g. the x and e(u 1 , BY )), and it outputs the generated session key using key derivation function PRF. Moreover, each session participant sayÂ might send its certificate certÂ instead of the tuple (Â, A, t A ) in the message flow. Those parameters used to compute those tags are particularly customized to be independent of any information about session participants. This enables the protocol to be able to perfectly run in the post-specified peer setting.
Efficiency Consideration
In this section, we consider the issue on improving the efficiency of proposed protocol P1. It is not hard to see that the consistency checks on both long-term and ephemeral keys consume much computational cost which requires four pairing operations. Thus how to reduce the cost on those consistency checks is our major concern.
We first introduce an alternative consistency checking algorithm which is derived from the similar technique in [22] used to improve the efficiency of identity-based KEM scheme. The idea is to merge consistency checks on incoming Diffie-Hellman keys. In the new consistency check algorithm, a partŷ A on receiving (B, B, t B , Y, t Y ) may perform the following steps:
2. Reject the session if e(t
We claim that the combined consistency check equation implies that all received tags are consistent. To prove our argument we define functions
. Obviously, if t Y , t B , t Z , t C are consistent we would have the fact ∆ 1 (t Y ) = ∆ 2 (t B ) =
Hence for random values
) θ 2 evaluates to 1 if t Y , t B are consistent and to a random group value in G T otherwise. This alternative consistency check algorithm roughly substitutes one multiple-exponentiation for one pairing operation. But the random values θ 1 and θ 2 would be included into the returns of StateReveal query since the consistency check algorithm is executed on host machine.
In addition, please notice that a partyÂ has to check the consistency of long-term key in every sessions that might be costly and unnecessary. An alternative solution could let the Certificate Authority to do the consistency check on long-term public key during key registration protocol. In this way, it could reduce two pairing operations during key exchange execution and also the number of public key. To register a public key pkÂ = A, each partyÂ should at least prove the consistency of long-term public key via tag t A . Then the long-term public key A is registered if e(t A , g) = e(A, u
. This check would be done only once at CA. In particular, the tag t A is required while querying the RegisterCorrupt(Â, pkÂ, pfÂ) in the security game, i.e. pfÂ = t A .
Security Analysis
We show the security of proposed protocol in our strong security model. Theorem 2. Assume each ephemeral key chosen during key exchange has bit-size λ ∈ N. Suppose that the BDDH problem is (t, BDDH )-hard in the symmetric bilinear groups PG, the TCRHF is (t, TCRHF )-secure target collision resistant hash function family, and the PRF is (q prf , t, PRF )-secure pseudo-random function family. Then the proposed protocol is (t , )-session-key-secure in the sense of Definition 12 with t ≈ t and q prf ≥ d and ≤
The proof of this theorem is presented in the Appendix B. Table 2 : Comparisons among one-round 2AKE protocols in the standard model.
We further remark that both FXSY and Okamoto protocols need at least two rounds to exchange information between host machine and secure device. In the first round the host machine may send randomness to the secure device and get back the ephemeral key (or ciphertext of KEM.EnCap algorithm); and in the second round, the host machine may send intermediate values to secure device and obtain the final session key from secure device. Therefore, our GC-KKN scheme is more HS-round efficient than those schemes, since only one such round is required. Although optimized P1 requires four pairing operations, it enjoys the most succinct structure and the most efficient algorithm on secure device.
Conclusions
We showed a generic construction GC-KKN for eCK-secure one-round two party AKE protocols in the standard model without NAXOS trick, which can be instantiated with passively secure KE scheme, IND-CCA secure KEM schemes and CKS-light secure NIKE schemes. In contrast to previous works in the standard model, the major merit of GC-KKN is its outstanding efficiency on implementing with secure device. In other word, only a small part of algorithms of GC-KKN need to be run on secure device to achieve state leakage resistant. We also gave a concrete protocol P1 based on the construction idea of GC-KKN. Similarly P1 is motivated to further improve the efficiency on secure device wherein only one regular exponential operation is required. The P1 was proved eCK secure in the standard model under only standard assumptions including BDDH assumption and secure target collision resistant hash function family and pseudo-random function family. To our best of knowledge, P1 is the first such protocol without NAXOS trick that can run under post-specified peer setting without knowing any information of communication peer at session activation.
[ 
A Proof of Theorem 1
It is straightforward to verify that two accepted oracles (of considered protocol) having matching sessions would generate the same session key. In the sequel, we wish to show that the adversary is unable to distinguish random value from the session key of any fresh oracle. have matching sessions, and we have the following 'freshness' related disjoint cases:
• Case 1 (C1): The adversary did not issue Corrupt(Â) and Corrupt(B).
• Case 2 (C2): The adversary did not issue StateReveal(π s * A ) and StateReveal(π t * B ).
• Case 3 (C3): The adversary did not issue StateReveal(π s * A ) and Corrupt(B).
• Case 4 (C4): The adversary did not issue Corrupt(Â) and StateReveal(π t * B ). In order to complete the proof of Theorem 1, we must provide the security proofs for above six cases. We first show three propositions to facilitate our proof. Note that the proof of these two propositions can be found in [32] . Proposition 1. If adversary A breaks the session key security of the proposed protocol in case C4, then there exists adversary A who can launch a successful attack in case C3.
Proposition 2.
If adversary A breaks the session key security of the proposed protocol in case C1 (C3), then there exists adversary A who can launch a successful attack in the case C5 (C6).
Therefore, we prove the advantage of the adversary is negligible under the proof simulation for cases C2 and C5 and C6. The proof proceeds in a sequence of games, following [36, 4] . The first game is the real security experiment, as assumed that there exists an adversary A that breaks the session key security of the proposed protocol. We then describe several intermediate games that step-wisely modify the original game. Finally we prove that (under the stated security assumptions), no adversary can break the security of the protocol.
Let S δ be the event that the adversary wins the security experiment under the Game δ and freshness cases in the set {C2, C5, C6}. Let ADV δ := Pr[S δ ] − 1/2 denote the advantage of A in Game δ. Consider the following sequence of games.
Game 0. This is the original eCK game with adversary A under freshness cases C 2 , C 5 and C 6 . Thus we have that Pr[S 0 ] = 1/2 + = 1/2 + ADV 0 .
Game 1. In this game, the challenger proceeds exactly like previous game, except that we add a abortion rule. The challenger raises event abort trans and aborts, if during the simulation either the ephemeral key epk s i (outputted by KE.EKGen) or C s i (generated by KEM) replied by an oracle π s i but it has been sample by another oracle π w u or sent by adversary before. Since there are d such values would be sampled randomly by KEM or KE. Due to theirs security, the event abort trans occurs with probability Pr[abort trans ] ≤ (d ) 2 2 λ where λ is a large integer as assumed before. We therefore have that
Note that the transcript of protocol messages shared by two oracles having matching sessions is unique in this game, so that the adversary can't replay any ciphertext or ephemeral key to result in two fresh oracles generating the same session key but without matching sessions.
Game 2. This game proceeds as previous game, but C aborts if one of the following guesses fails: (i) the freshness case occurred to test oracle in the set {C2, C5, C6}, (ii) the test oracle π s * A , and (iii) its partner oracle π t * B in case C2 or the intended communication partyB in cases C5 and C6. Since there are 3 fresh related cases, parties at all and at most d oracles for each party, then the probability that all guesses of C are correct is at least 1/3(d ) 2 . Thus we have that
In the following, we always assume that the challenger guesses correctly.
Game 3. This game is proceeded as previous game, but the challenger C does the following modifications:
1. In the case C2, replace the key eK is received by an oracle π tB , the key K * A is used instead of KEM.DeCap(skB, C * Game 4. We change this game from previous one by modifying the generation of output of SEXT in terms of freshness cases. Specifically, (i) in case C2 the value eK * of test oracle and its partner oracle(if it exists) is replaced with a uniform random value instead of the use of SEXT( eK * ), (ii) in the case C5 the ShKÂ ,B is replaced with a uniform random value instead of the use of SEXT( ShKÂ ,B ) for oracles having both session participantsÂ andB, (iii) and in the case C6, we replace K * A of test oracle with a random value and we do the same replacement for the oracles ofB receiving the ciphertext C * A generated by test oracle. Those changes are possible since we have the fact either key eK * or key ShKÂ ,B or key K * A has been modified to be random value in previous game. By the security of the strong randomness extraction function, we have that
Game 5. In this game, we change function PRF(ShKÂ ,B , ·) in the case C5 or the function PRF(K * A , ·) in the case C6 or function PRF(eK * , ·) in the case C2 to a truly random function for test oracle and its partner oracle (if it exists). We make use of the fact, that the at least one of those three secret seeds of the PRFs of test oracle is a truly random value due to the modification in previous game. If there exists a polynomial time adversary A can distinguish the Game 5 from Game 4. Then we can construct an algorithm B using A to break the security of PRF. Exploiting the security of PRF, we have that
Note that in this game the session key returned by Test-query is totally a truly random value which is independent to the bit b and any messages. Thus the advantage that the adversary wins this game is ADV 5 = 0. Put together all probabilities from Game 0 to Game 5, we proved this theorem.
B Proof of Theorem 2
First of all, it is straightforward to verify that two accepted oracles of considered protocol with matching sessions would generate the same session key. In the sequel, we wish to show that the adversary is unable to distinguish random value from the session key of any fresh oracle. Without loss of generality, we consider that the adversary chooses the test oracle π s * A executed between owner A with its indented partnerB. Next we introduce the notations which might be used in the proof. Let partyĈ denote the indented partner of oracle π sÂ whereĈ could be any parties butÂ in the security game and has long-term public key C = g c , and let W = g w denote the ephemeral public key received by oracle π sÂ .
In a similar way, oracle π tB has indented party denoted byD with long-term public key D = g d , and the received ephemeral key by π tB is N = g n . Meantime the ephemeral keys generated by oracles π sÂ and π tB are X = g x and Y = g y respectively. we use the superscript '*' to highlight corresponding values processed in the test oracle and its partner oracle (if it exists), say the ephemeral key X * generated by oracle π s * A . Applying the propositions 1 and 2 from [32] , the security proof can be given only under freshness cases C2, C5 and C6. The proof proceeds in a sequence of games, following [36, 4] . The first game is the real security experiment, as assumed that there exists an adversary A that breaks the session key security of the proposed protocol. We then describe several intermediate games that stepwisely modify the original game. Finally we prove that (under the stated security assumptions), no Note that in this game the session key returned by Test-query is totally a truly random value which is independent to the bit b and any messages. Thus the advantage that A wins this game is ADV 5 = 0.
Sum up the probabilities from Game 0 to Game 5, we proved this theorem.
